This study investigates whether the quality of investment banks impacts shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Focusing on a US sample of 415 targets and 1,066 bidders from 1995 to 2010, we find that the quality of financial advisors appears to have a significant impact on shareholder wealth for bidding firms, but not for target firms. Our results find that bidders experience higher losses when hiring tier-1 advisors. Interestingly, further analysis shows that this finding holds during 'normal' periods, but not during the crisis (1997-1999 and 2007-2009) periods. With a significant negative relationship between tier-1 advisors and bidder announcement returns in the regression analysis, our results suggest that more prestigious financial advisors lead to larger losses for bidders in bank mergers. The results suggest overpayment by bidders when hiring more prestigious financial advisors in bank mergers. Our results also indicate the importance of financial advisors to bidder shareholder wealth.
I. Introduction
Merger and acquisition activities have significantly increased over the last decade. Andrade et al. (2001) argue that several factors, such as economic, regulatory and industrial shocks, may result in merger waves. Merger waves take place not only for industrial firms but also for financial firms. Banks may engage in mergers and acquisitions triggered by deregulation and globalization. On the other hand, banks may intend to combine with other financial firms in order to respond to economic shocks, such as financial crises. In this stream, banks may attempt to look for potentially suitable firms and enlarge their market shares through mergers and acquisitions. Some banks may hire investment banks to facilitate the transactions. Due to information asymmetry, the target or bidder may not have sufficient information to evaluate its merger partners. The merger participants may require an intermediary to gather information relevant to the firm and negotiate the transaction. Hence, investment banks play an important role for their clients in the process of mergers and acquisitions (McLaughlin, 1990; Kale et al., 2003; Schiereck et al., 2009) . Schiereck et al. (2009) argue that investment banks assist their clients to identify potential bidders and targets.
The use of investment banks can also facilitate deal completion where financial advisors more in public acquisitions when hiring top-tier advisors.
In addition, Ismail (2009) Turning to the evidence for targets, McLaughlin (1992) finds no significant relationship between the quality of investment banks and target premia. Chahine and Ismail (2009) lend support to this point in their study. In addition, several studies explore the link between abnormal returns and the reputation of investment banks. Water et al. (2008) report that targets earn lower abnormal returns when more reputable advisors are selected. Schiereck et al. (2009) find similar results and document that their findings do not support higher target gains in association with the choice of first-tier banks relative to other banks.
However, such findings are not supported by all studies. For example, Bowers and Miller (1990) report that targets gain more if either the target or bidder is advised by a first-tier advisor, and Allen et al. (2004) find that targets obtain higher gains when targets employ its own banks as financial advisors.
In sum, several studies have examined the role of investment banks on the influence of shareholder wealth. However, the prior studies report mixed results, and the studies do not provide a clear picture of the effects of financial advisors in M&As. Furthermore, prior studies mainly focus on industrial firms, not financial firms. As banks are highly regulated, results from prior studies may not hold for financial firms. This suggests a need for further research. As a result, this study extends prior empirical studies to explore whether the quality of financial advisors impacts shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
III. Hypotheses development
To examine the importance of the role of investment banks on the influence of wealth gains in mergers and acquisitions, the hypotheses are developed as follows. According to the superior deal hypothesis, investment banks with higher reputation can offer their experience and expertise in evaluating transactions. These investment banks have more ability to identify good candidates and get better merger proposals (Kale et al., 2003; Ismail, 2009; Schiereck et al., 2009). Wang and Whyte (2010) argue that investment banks tend to be employed when deals are more complex. Rau (2000) and Schiereck et al. (2009) also argue that the existence of investment banks is an important determinant of the bank's market share that can affect the performance of the bidding firm. Thus, the choice of more reputable investment banks can be expected to offer higher bargaining power to the firm and deals can be negotiated on more favorable terms to them. From this, it can be expected that the use of investment banks or more reputable investment banks will lead to higher gains to the firm in bank mergers. While the financial crisis had a significant impact on the banking industry, and possibly made acquisitions more risky and complex, more reputable financial advisors may have a greater ability to look for firms valuable to their clients. Thus, it can be further predicted that investment banks can create higher synergies to the firm during the period of the financial crisis.
In addition, the deal completion hypothesis argues that investment banks have strong incentives to complete transactions due to their contingent fees (Rau, 2000; Walter et al., 2008; Ismail, 2009; Chahine and Ismail, 2009) . While investment banks are concerned about their fee income, they do not intend to increase acquisition prices to a level that may damage their reputation capital (McLaughlin, 1990; Golubov et al., 2011) . Walter et al. (2008) similarly argue that advisors are only interested in completing transactions faster. They argue that the reputation of investment banks only relates to the completion of deals. If this is the case, the gains earned by their clients can be expected to have no relationship to the quality of their advisor. Thus, this hypothesis predicts that there is no relationship between gains to the firm and the use of investment banks or more reputable investment banks. Furthermore, it can be predicted that investment banks have no impact on the gains for the firm during the period of the financial crisis. We test these alternative hypotheses in Section Five.
IV. Sample and methodology

Sample selection
The sample of mergers and acquisitions in the US is obtained from Thomson Financial SDC One Banker database. The investigation period covers the years from 1995 to 2010.
To be included in the sample, each transaction is required to meet the following criteria.
We require the bidding firm to be a bank and the target firm to be a financial firm. This criterion enables the current study to further control for the factor of diversifying or focusing deals.
US.
Requiring either the target or bidding firm to be listed reduces the sample to 13,169 transactions. The sample is further restricted to deals classified as acquisition of majority interest, merger or exchange offer. The transaction must be complete and the transaction value is restricted to be at least 10 million US dollars so as to reduce any bias induced by small deals. This reduces the sample to 2,581 deals. We further require that the bidding firm owns more than 50% of the target shares after the transaction in order to focus on the change of control. Accordingly, a further 30 transactions are eliminated from the sample, leaving 2,551 deals. As hostile takeovers are rare among banking firms, we further remove three hostile deals.
Share prices and financial data were collected from Datastream. If share price is missing, the transaction is removed from the sample. Financial characteristics are gathered from the calendar year end prior to the announcement date. To avoid any bias resulting from confounding events, we also control for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window without any announcement of other corporate events. The SEC filings database is employed to control for this issue. The final sample contains 415 targets and 1,066 bidders.
The measurement of the reputation of the financial advisor
Investment banks usually offer their expertise and experience in the process of mergers and acquisitions. An investment bank's reputation largely depends on its past performance (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Walter et al., 2008) . Prior studies usually use a static ranking system to measure the quality of financial advisors (McLaughlin, 1992; Rau, 2000) . Rau (2000) argues that this measurement can obtain a stable ranking to measure the quality of financial advisors. However, Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) and Walter et al. (2008) argue that this ranking procedure does not take into account the dynamics of the M&A advisor market that may alter the level of financial advisor quality. For bank mergers taking place in 1995, the quality of investment banks is measured from the year of 1994, etc. This allows the measure of financial advisor quality to better match the market condition in this study.
In addition, prior studies usually classify financial advisors into two or three tiers on the basis of their market share in the takeover market (McLaughlin, 1992; Rau, 2000; Saunders and Srinivasan, 2001; Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Ismail, 2009) 
Control variables
Several prior studies have demonstrated the importance of deal and firm characteristics on abnormal returns in M&As. Controlling for these characteristics enables the current study to more precisely examine the relationship between the quality of financial advisors and the abnormal returns of the firm. Thus, this study controls for the effects of relatedness, the payment method, performance, growth potential, capital ratio and firm size.
DeLong (2001) argues that focusing deals may create value to the firm. Managers may have more ability to manage similar risks. However, diversifying transactions may result in risk reduction (Beitel et al., 2004) . Several studies report that focused activities create more value than diversifying transactions (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; DeLong, 2001 DeLong, , 2003 Beiel et al., 2004) . Following Campa and Hernando (2004) A firm with high growth potential is arguably more attractive. Such a firm may also appear to be more expensive. Akhigbe et al. (2004) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find that target announcement returns are positively related to the market to book ratio. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) report that bidder announcement returns are positively correlated to their market to book ratio. Growth potential is proxied by the market to book ratio, where the ratio is defined as the market value of equity to the book value of equity.
Taking into account firm size, Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) find that target announcement returns are negatively related to target size. Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) and Fields et al. (2007) also find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively associated with bidder size. Thus, we control for firm size, measured as ln(total assets).
Methodology
To examine the quality of financial advisors on the effects of bank merger and acquisition announcements for the firms, we follow Brown and Warner's (1985) To better understand the impact of the quality of investment banks on shareholder wealth in bank mergers, we apply cross-sectional regression analysis, controlling for relatedness, cash payment, performance, growth potential, capital ratio, and firm size. This also enables the current study to explore the determinants that can affect the announcement returns in bank mergers. The regression model is specified as follows: potential is proxied by the market to book ratio of equity. The capital ratio is calculated as total capital to total assets, while size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Table 1 shows that tier-1 advisors that are hired by targets tend to engage in large transactions, with these deals having a mean transaction value of 9,269 million US dollars. The same finding can be observed for bidding firms. Bidders advised by tier-1 advisors undertake transactions with a mean value of 3,576 million US dollars.
V. Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
[Insert Table 1 here]
In panel B, we present the summary of the firm-specific characteristics of the sample.
The figure shows that bidders tend to have higher growth potential, with the mean value of the market to book ratio at 2.08 relative to that of targets at 1.65. In addition, targets on average appear to hold higher capital ratio than bidders, with the capital ratio at 0.20 and 0.15 for targets and bidders, respectively. This suggests that target managers may manage their capital inefficiently. Although bidders tend to be larger than targets, the performance of targets and bidders appears to be the same.
Empirical findings for targets
Target abnormal returns based on the quality of financial advisors
This section presents empirical findings for targets with/without financial advisors and also with different quality of financial advisors. The results in Table 2 show that targets earn positive announcement returns regardless of whether they use financial advisors.
The results are all statistically significant. However, the results show that targets that do not hire financial advisors on average obtain slightly higher gains relative to those hiring financial advisors. These findings suggest that the use of financial advisors can reduce gains for targets. A possible explanation is that targets with financial advisors need to pay advisory fees, thus reducing the gains to target firms. However, the difference in abnormal returns between target banks with investment bank advisors and those without is small and not statistically significant.
[Insert Table 2 
Target announcement returns during crisis and normal periods
This section presents the empirical evidence for target firms, taking into account the periods of normal and crisis years and the quality of financial advisors.
9 If high quality of financial advisors plays an important role in mergers and acquisitions, they can be expected to better negotiate deals with favorable terms for target firms in a crisis periods.
As Table 3 shows, targets on average obtain marginally higher announcement returns during normal years, averaging 17.58% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, compared to 16.14% in the crisis period. While the levels of abnormal returns are statistically significant, the differences in abnormal returns between the normal and crisis periods are not.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We further partition the sample based on the quality of financial advisors during the periods of the normal and crisis years. 10 Consistent with our previous findings in Table   2 , we find that targets advised by tier-3 advisors obtain higher gains than those advised by tier-1/2 advisors regardless of the time period. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the normal period only.
Taking into account the period of the crisis years, we also split the sample on the basis of However, while the levels of cumulative abnormal returns are significant, the differences are not statistically significant.
Cross-sectional regression analysis for targets
This section provides cross-sectional regression analysis for targets in order to examine the level of investment banks on the influence of shareholder wealth. The regression analysis also controls for the deal and firm characteristics.
11
To investigate the impact of the quality of financial advisors on target shareholder wealth, we use the dummy variable for target advisors. The dummy equals to 1 if target advisors are classified as tier-1 advisors; 0 otherwise. We also control for the crisis period dummy in order to examine how financial advisors perform towards target firms in the crisis period compared to the normal period. The dummy equals to 1 if M&As take place during the 1997-1999 and 2007-2009 crisis periods. In addition, we also control for the interactive term between the dummy of tier-1 advisors and the crisis period in the regression analysis to better understand whether more reputable financial advisors create higher gains to target shareholders during the crisis period. For the deal characteristics, we control for a relatedness dummy and a cash dummy. With regard to firm characteristics, the regression analysis further controls for profitability (ROA), growth potential (market to book ratio), capital ratio, and firm size (ln(total assets)).
The results in Table 4 show that there is an insignificant negative relationship between tier-1 advisors and target announcement returns. With regard to control variables, the results indicate that higher gains to targets are associated with lower growth potential and smaller targets. As can be seen in Table 4 , there is a significant increase in explanatory power in terms of adjusted R squared, from around 0 to 4% when additionally controlling for firm characteristics. This suggests the importance of controlling for firm characteristics in the regression analysis.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Empirical findings for bidders
Bidder abnormal returns based on the quality of financial advisors
This section reports the empirical results for bidders with/without financial advisors, and the quality of financial advisors. As shows in Table 5 , the results reveal that bidders obtain negative announcement returns regardless of the presence of financial advisors.
The empirical evidence shows that bidders who use financial advisors experience higher losses than those who do not hire financial advisors. For example, bidders that hired financial advisors obtain -1.61% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window relative to -0.26% for those who did not hire financial advisors. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results suggest that financial advisors may concentrate on completing deals than on getting the best deal for their clients.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Given the use of financial advisors, we further analyze bidder announcement returns based on the quality of financial advisors in order to examine whether high-quality financial advisors outperform those of low quality. As can be seen in Table 5 , bidders advised by tier-1 advisors on average experience higher losses than those advised by tier-2 and tier-3 advisors. These findings are consistent with prior studies, e.g., McLaughlin (1992) , Servaes and Zenner (1996) , Rau (2000), Rau and Rodgers (2002), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and Allen et al. (2004) . However, the differences in returns between banks with different tiers of advisors are not statistically significant.
Bidder announcement returns in different periods
To better understand whether reputable financial advisors outperform those with poor reputation during the financial crisis periods, we further partition the sample based on normal and financial crisis periods. Given the presence of financial advisors, Table 6 shows that bidders on average experience slightly higher losses during the financial crisis period than those in the normal period, of -1.70% versus -1.55%. Both are statistically significant at the 0.01 level, but not significantly different from each other.
[Insert Table 6 here]
However, the results show that bidders advised by tier-1/2 advisors on average experience higher losses during the normal period than those advised by tier-3 advisors,
suggesting that the use of higher quality of financial advisors generally result in worse performance to bidding firms during the normal period.
Interestingly, however, we find conflicting results during the crisis period. The results
show that more prestigious investment banks appear to have better performance in the crisis period than less reputable financial advisors. This finding indicates that more reputable financial advisors seem to offer their expertise in negotiating transactions during crisis periods. Our findings also illustrate the importance of financial advisors to bidders when M&As take place during crisis periods.
Additionally, we also examine the impact of bidder shareholder wealth during different crisis periods. This sheds light on whether there is any difference in bidder announcement returns during these two financial crisis periods. The evidence shows that bidders on average experience higher losses during the 1997-1999 crisis period than the 2007-2009 crisis period. The difference between these two financial crisis periods is statistically significant.
Cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders
To determine the impact of the quality of financial advisors on bidder shareholder wealth, we also control for deal-and firm-specific characteristics. With regard to control variables, the results show that bidders obtain higher gains when the payment method is cash and when bidders have a higher capital ratio. However, more importantly, the results show that announcement returns are lower for bidders using tier-1 advisors.
These results hold when we control for the crisis versus normal periods, with bidders that use first-tier financial advisors obtaining lower announcement returns in bank mergers. 12 The findings lend support to our previous results. The results are also consistent with prior studies (e.g., Servaes and Zenner, 1996 , Rau, 2000 , Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003 , Allen et al., 2004 , Walter et al., 2008 .
[Insert Table 7 here]
VI. Conclusion
This study investigates whether firms advised by investment banks with higher reputation obtain higher gains, and whether firms that hire financial advisors with high reputation have better performance during the period of financial crisis. Focusing on financial firms and using a sample of 415 US targets and 1,066 US bidders from 1995 to 2010, the results show that targets advised by tier-3 advisors on average earn higher announcement returns relative to those by tier-1 and tier-2 advisors, and tier-3 advisors on average create higher returns to targets during both normal and crisis period.
However, the regression analysis cannot find any significant relationship between tier-1 advisors and target announcement returns.
In addition, the evidence reveals that bidders advised by tier-1 advisors generally obtain lower announcement returns than those advised by less prestigious advisors although bidders on average experience negative announcement returns. Interestingly, our results
show that bidders advised by tier-1 advisors on average experience larger losses during the normal period, but not to the crisis period. The regression analysis lends support to the point that bidders advised by tier-1 advisors are associated with lower bidder announcement returns.
bidding firms, but not to target firms. Specifically, we find that tier-1 financial advisors tend to outperform during the crisis period, suggesting that tier-1 financial advisors can be expected to carefully evaluate the transactions during the crisis period for bidding firms. As bidders advised by more prestigious financial advisors experience larger losses in bank mergers, the results suggest that bidder managers advised by more prestigious financial advisors may be overconfident when evaluating synergies. However, more reputable financial advisors may be more valuable in acquisitions during crisis periods. Table 1 Panel B presents summary descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. Growth (market to book ratio) is measured as market value of the equity to book value of the equity. Capital is measured as total capital to total assets. Ln(Total assets) is measured as the log of total assets. The financial characteristics are collected from the year end prior to the announcement in the Datastream database. Table 4 presents cross-sectional regression analysis for targets. The sample of the top and bottom 1% target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns is deleted in order to control for outliers. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns. The independent variable includes the dummy of relatedness, cash, ROA, growth, capital ratio, ln(total assets), tier-1, crisis and interactive. Interactive is calculated as the dummy of tier-1 financial advisors multiplied by the dummy of the crisis period. The dummy equals to1 if the deal is classified as diversification, payment is cash, target advisors are classified as tier-1 investment banks, and bank mergers take place in the crisis period. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. Growth (market to book ratio) is measured as the market value of the equity to the book value of the equity. Capital is measured as total capital to total assets. Ln(total assets) is calculated as the log of total assets. The financial data is collected from the year end prior to the transaction in the Datastream database. White's (1980) heteroskedasticity is used to compute p-value. *** indicates significance at 0.01 level; ** indicates significance at 0.05 level; Table 7 presents cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders. The sample of top and bottom 1%
3-day (-1,+1) bidder cumulative abnormal returns is deleted in order to control for outliers. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns. The independent variable includes the dummy of relatedness, cash, ROA, growth, capital ratio, ln(total assets), tier-1, crisis, and interactive. Interactive is calculated as the dummy of tier-1 financial advisors multiplied by the dummy of the crisis period. The dummy equals to 1 if the deal is classified as diversification, payment is cash, target advisors are classified as tier-1 investment banks, and bank mergers take place in the crisis period. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. Growth (market to book ratio) is measured as the market value of the equity to the book value of the equity. Capital is measured as total capital to total assets. Ln(total assets) is calculated as the log of total assets. The financial data is collected from the year end prior to the transaction in the Datastream database. White's (1980) heteroskedasticity is used to compute p-value. *** indicates significance at 0.01 level; ** indicates significance at 0.05 level;
